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CUMULATIVE AND LIMITED VOTING:
MINORITY ELECTORAL OPPORTUNITIES AND MORE1

RICHARD L. ENGSTROM*
INTRODUCTION
Geographically based majority-minority single member districts (SMDs)
have been the medium generally, but not exclusively, for providing minority
groups protected by the Voting Rights Act (VRA) with new opportunities to
elect representatives of their choice to legislative bodies.2 Two other election
systems have been used for this purpose as well: cumulative (CV) and limited
voting (LV). Depending on the situation, these alternative systems can provide
electoral opportunities for minorities when majority-minority SMDs cannot be
created and sometimes provide more and/or better opportunities even when
such districts can be created. While proposed at times for the election of
members of the United States House of Representatives and state legislatures,3
their adoption so far has been limited to elections for local legislative bodies.

1. This is a revised and updated version of a paper presented at the Symposium on “Voting
25 Years after the Voting Rights Act,” St. Louis University Public Law Review, St. Louis, MO,
Mar. 26, 2010.
* Visiting Research Fellow at the Center for the Study of Race, Ethnicity, and Gender in the
Social Sciences, Duke University. Disclosure: The author served as an expert witness for the
defendants in the remedial portions of the two cases that are the focus of this article, United States
of America v. Village of Port Chester, NY and United States of America v. Euclid City Sch. Bd.
The defendants’ preferences for cumulative or limited voting remedies in these cases were
established prior to his retention in both instances. Portions of this paper rely heavily on his
reports in those cases.
2. Minority groups protected by the VRA are African Americans and “language
minorities.” 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973(a), 1973b(f)(2) (2006). “Language minorities” are defined in the
statute as Latinos, Native Americans, Asian Americans, and Alaskan Natives. 42 U.S.C. §
1973l(c)(3) (2006).
3. For cumulative voting, see, e.g., Dan Johnson-Weinberger, Cumulative voting legislation
introduced in state senate, CHI. INDEP. MEDIA CTR. (Oct. 14, 2001, 11:50 PM), http://chicago.
indymedia.org/newswire/display/5413/index.php. On limited voting, see, e.g., Lee Mortimer,
Want Political Competition?; Create Multi-member Legislative Districts, Allow Each Voter Just
One Vote, CHARLOTTE OBSERVER, Nov. 19, 2006, at A26.
97
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There are about 100 local governing bodies across seven states now using
CV or LV for this purpose.4 Almost all of these adoptions have been in
response to vote dilution litigation under the Voting Rights Act (VRA), or
threats thereof, alleging that at-large (jurisdiction-wide) elections used to elect
members of these bodies dilute the votes cast by minority voters. The critical
issue in these cases is whether an at-large system has the effect of submerging
the votes of minority voters into those cast by the rest of the electorate, thereby
denying minority voters with equal opportunities to elect representatives of
their choice. Minority plaintiffs have been the party that proposed these
systems, often in the context of settlement.5 In the past few years however
some defendant jurisdictions have brought these alternatives to the table, and
more can be expected to do so in the future.
Local government jurisdictions have discovered that their at-large election
systems can be cleansed of dilutive effects by attaching either CV or LV rules
to the at-large format. This also allows them to avoid features of SMD systems
that they consider unfavorable, especially in jurisdictions that have a small
population or small geographic area. Recently, two defendant jurisdictions,
after federal courts found their at-large arrangements to be impermissibly
dilutive, have expressed a preference for these systems over SMDs as remedies
for the problem, and in both instances federal courts have adopted these
systems rather than the plaintiffs’ proposed SMD remedies. This will no doubt
stimulate increased interest in these modified at-large systems by numerous
local government jurisdictions in the future.
The two recent cases were challenges brought by the United States
Department of Justice (DOJ), on behalf of protected minorities, to local
government at-large election systems under section 2 of the VRA.6 The DOJ
brought suit in late 2006 against the Village of Port Chester, New York, a
jurisdiction 2.4 square miles in area with a population of 27,867 according to
the 2000 census,7 claiming that the at-large system used to elect its Board of
Trustees diluted the voting strength of the village’s Latino minority.8 The
citizen voting age population (CVAP) in the village was estimated by a DOJ

4. Sixty-two such bodies use cumulative voting and thirty-five use limited voting. See
Communities in America Currently Using Proportional Voting, FAIRVOTE, http://archive.fair
vote.org/?page=2101.
5. See, e.g., Edward Still, Cumulative and Limited Voting in Alabama, in UNITED STATES
ELECTORAL SYSTEMS: THEIR IMPACT ON WOMEN AND MINORITIES 183 (Wilma Rule and Joseph
Francis Zimmerman eds., 1992).
6. Section 2 of the VRA precludes electoral arrangements that provide a protected group
with less opportunity to elect representatives of their choice than “other members of the
electorate.” 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b) (2006).
7. Declaration of Andrew A. Beveridge at 4, United States v. Vill. of Port Chester, 704 F.
Supp. 2d 411 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (No. 06-15173).
8. Complaint at 1, Vill. of Port Chester, 704 F. Supp. 2d 411 (No. 06-15173).
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expert witness to be 27.5% Latino that year.9 After a federal court, in 2008,
agreed with the DOJ,10 the village proposed CV as the remedy for the dilution.
Over the objections of the DOJ, the court approved the use of the CV
alternative.11 The first CV election in the village was on June 15, 2010, and
resulted in the election of the first Latino to the Board of Trustees.12
The DOJ also sued the Euclid City School Board (Euclid CSB) in Ohio in
late 2008, claiming that the at-large election system for its Board of Education
similarly diluted the voting strength of the African American minority in the
school district.13 The district is 10.3 square miles in area14 and had a
population of 51,357 in 2007, according to the estimate provided by the
American Community Survey for that year.15 African Americans comprised
40.2% of the voting age population.16 This case followed a decision by a
federal court in another lawsuit brought by DOJ challenging the mixed election
system, containing both at-large and district elections, for the Euclid City
Council. The court in that case held that the at-large portion of this system
diluted the voting strength of the city’s African American minority.17
The Euclid CSB and the City of Euclid are coterminous jurisdictions, and
therefore share the same electorate.18 In light of the decision in the city case,
the school board stipulated that its at-large format had the same dilutive effect
in school board elections.19 Unlike the city, however, the school board
eschewed an SMD remedy, again favored by DOJ, preferring instead either CV
or LV as the remedy.20 The court approved the LV voting option.21 Voters
would have one vote in each of the staggered school board elections, with
9. All estimates for 2006 in the case are found in Declaration of Andrew A. Beveridge,
supra note 7, at 4, 6.
10. Vill. of Port Chester, 704 F. Supp. 2d at 416.
11. Id.
12. See infra Part V.
13. United States v. Euclid City Sch. Bd., 632 F. Supp. 2d 740, 743 (N.D. Ohio 2009).
14. About the City of Euclid: Statistics, CITY OF EUCLID, http://www.cityofeuclid.com/
about/census (last visited Mar. 8, 2011).
15. See U.S. Census Bureau, 2005-2007 American Community Survey 3-Year Estimates,
http://factfinder.census.gov/servlet/CTTable?_bm=y&-context=ct&-ds_name=ACS_2007_3YR_
G00_&-mt=_name=ACS_2007_3YR_G2000_B09001&-tree_id=3307&-redoLog=false&-geo_id
=06000US3903525704&-search_results=01000US&-dataitem=ACS_2007_3YR_G2000_B0100
3.B01003_1_EST|ACS_2007_3YR_G2000_B09001.B09001_1_EST&-format=&-subj_treenode
_id=17465966&-_lang=en.
16. Euclid City Sch. Bd., 632 F. Supp. 2d at 745.
17. United States v. City of Euclid, 523 F. Supp. 2d 641 (N.D. Ohio 2007); United States v.
City of Euclid, 580 F. Supp. 2d 584, 586, 613 (N.D. Ohio 2008).
18. Factual Stipulation of the Parties as to Liability at 2, Euclid City Sch. Bd., 632 F. Supp.
2d 740 (No. 08-2832), ECF No. 2.
19. Id. at 2, 5.
20. Euclid City Sch. Bd., 632 F. Supp. 2d at 744–45, 755.
21. Id. at 771.
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three-seats up one year and two the other.22 The first LV election did not result
in the election of the only African American candidate, but did result in the
candidate clearly preferred by the African American voters being elected.23
This article addresses how CV and LV systems work, and how they
provide electoral opportunities for minority voters. It also identifies other
features of these systems, or consequences of them, that jurisdictions might
find attractive, as did Port Chester and the Euclid CSB, as well as features of
the SMD system that jurisdictions might find unattractive, as was also the case

22. Id. at 744–46.
23. See Table 6, infra. Two other cases recently brought by the DOJ were settled by the
adoption of a one vote LV system. One filed in 2009 concerned at-large elections for the
Commission in the Town of Lake Park, Florida. Consent Judgment and Decree at 1, United
States v. Town of Lake Park, Fla., No. 09-80507 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 26, 2009), ECF No. 39. The
town is 2.3 square miles in area with a population of 8,721 according to the 2000 census. Id. at 2;
Telephone Interview with Thomas J. Baird, Attorney for Lake Park, Fla. (Feb. 3, 2010). African
Americans constituted 38% of the VAP in the city at that time. Consent Judgment and Decree,
supra note 23, at 2. Prior to trial, the town proposed to add either CV or LV to its at-large
election system, and the case was settled when the DOJ accepted the limited voting alternative, a
one vote per voter in four-seat elections. Id. at 4; Telephone Interview with Thomas J. Baird,
supra note 23.
The other case, an enforcement action by DOJ under section 5 of the VRA, resulted in the
adoption of LV on an interim basis in the City of Calera, Alabama. Calera’s total population was
estimated by the U.S. Census Bureau to be 9,398 as of July 2007, and African Americans
reportedly constituted 16.5% of the registered voters in the city as July 30, 2008. Complaint at 4,
United States v. City of Calera, 08-BE-1982-S (N.D. Ala. Oct. 24, 2008), ECF No. 1. Section 5
imposes a “preclearance” requirement on jurisdictions, primarily in the South, that are captured
by a coverage formula contained in section 4 of the Act. 42 U.S.C § 1973(c) (2006). This
requires covered jurisdictions, prior to implementing any change in their election arrangements,
to convince the DOJ, or a three-judge panel of the U.S. District Court for the District of
Columbia, that the change will not have a retrogressive purpose or effect on minority voters’
opportunity to elect representatives of their choice. Id. For a brief overview of section 5 and a
recent constitutional challenge to it, see Richard L. Engstrom, NAMUDNO: A Curveball on
Voting Rights, 30 JUST. SYS. J. 351 (2009). The DOJ has rarely denied preclearance to at-large
elections with CV or LV rules.
Calera had not received preclearance for 177 annexations, nor for a 2008 redistricting plan
for elections to its city council that included the annexed areas. Complaint, supra note 23, at 5.
This plan eliminated the only African American majority district in the city, which had been the
source for the only African American representative on the council. Id.; Telephone Interview
with Frank C. Ellis, Attorney for Calera (July 3, 2010). The DOJ in 2008 objected to the
annexations and the new districts, resulting in the 2008 municipal election held the day after the
objection being invalidated. Complaint, supra note 23, at 5–6. The enforcement action was
settled by an agreement to use a LV system, a one vote for six seats arrangement, until the city
precleared a new election arrangement following the 2010 census. Judgment and Order
Modifying Consent Decree, City of Calera, 08-BE-1982-S, ECF No. 10; Telephone Interview
with Frank C. Ellis, supra note 23.
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in Port Chester and the Euclid CSB. The decisions in these cases, which were
fully litigated, will be highlighted.24
I. MINORITY ELECTORAL OPPORTUNITIES
Local legislative bodies are often elected through jurisdiction-wide
elections in which all the voters may cast votes for as many candidates as there
are seats to be filled.25 This is especially common in jurisdictions with
relatively small populations. Many counties, municipalities, and school
districts employ this format to elect their legislatures.26 For example, if there
are five seats to be filled in an election to such a body, all of the voters residing
in the jurisdiction may cast a vote for up to five candidates. There are
numerous variations in how at-large elections are implemented, but regardless
of the particular arrangement, this system does have a tendency to favor the
candidates preferred by a majority group, or at least the largest group, of voters
within the jurisdiction.27 It provides the largest group of voters an opportunity
to determine the winners of all of the seats.
Minority groups protected by the Voting Rights Act have been particularly
vulnerable to being left without any representation by people from within their
own group when these arrangements have been employed.28 If their
preferences among the candidates are not shared by the other voters, the other
voters can veto their choices.
A.

Cumulative Voting

In an at-large CV system, each voter may be provided with as many votes
as there are seats to be filled in a particular election.29 However, the usual
restriction, in this country at least, that only a single vote may be cast for any
particular candidate is removed. Voters have more flexibility in exercising
their franchise under CV. They may distribute their votes across their
preferred candidates as they wish. In a five-seat, five-vote context, for
example, voters retain the option of providing a single vote to five different
candidates. But if a voter prefers two candidates more intensely than the
24. The DOJ appealed the district court’s decision in the Euclid case, but the appeal was
voluntarily dismissed. Order Granting Voluntary Dismissal, United States v. Euclid City Sch.
Bd., No. 09-4154 (6th Cir. Nov. 13, 2009).
25. Communities in America Currently Using Proportional Voting, supra note 4.
26. Id.
27. See Richard L. Engstrom & Michael D. McDonald, ‘Enhancing’ Factors in At-Large
Plurality and Majority Systems: A Reconsideration, 12 ELECTORAL STUD. 385, 385–86 (1993).
28. See THE QUIET REVOLUTION IN THE SOUTH: THE IMPACT OF THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT
1965-1990 at 7 (Chandler Davidson & Bernard Grofman eds., 1994).
29. Richard L. Engstrom, Delbert A. Taebel & Richard L. Cole, Cumulative Voting as a
Remedy for Minority Vote Dilution: The Case of Alamogordo, New Mexico, 5 J.L. & POL. 469,
476–77 (1989).
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others, for example, he or she may cast three votes for one of them and two
votes for the other, while a voter who strongly prefers the election of one
particular candidate may cast all five of their votes for that candidate (a
practice known as “plumping”). Generally, the only restriction in distributing
votes among the candidates is that the votes be cast in whole units.30 The
winning candidates in a CV election are determined by a simple plurality rule,
i.e., the five candidates receiving the most votes are elected to the five seats.31
Despite the at-large context, minority voters can have opportunities to elect
representatives of their choice when CV rules are employed. The removal of
the limit of one vote for any particular candidate permits minority voters, and
all other voters, to cast a more efficacious type of “single-shot” vote than they
may in more traditional multi-seat elections. The single-shot voting strategy
entails group members voting for only one particular candidate. Under the
traditional voting rules, when a group employs the single-shot strategy,
members of the group do not use all the votes available to them.32 The group’s
voters cast a vote for the candidate that they want elected, and withhold the rest
of their votes from all of the other candidates so as not to add to the vote totals
of those other candidates.33 The idea behind single-shot voting is that by
voting for one particular candidate and not contributing votes to the others, the
candidate preferred by the group might finish among the top N vote recipients
(N is the number of seats being filled) and win one of the seats.34
When CV rules are used, a group will not need to withhold its remaining
votes, as the group’s voters may cast those votes as well for the candidate or
candidates of their choice. CV allows voters to concentrate their votes much
more effectively, and thereby increase the opportunity that minority group
voters have to elect representatives preferred by them. A group does not have

30. Cottier v. City of Martin, 475 F. Supp. 2d 932, 936 (D.S.D. 2007), vacated on other
grounds by Cottier v. City of Martin, 604 F.3d. 553 (8th Cir. 2010).
31. It is not necessary that voters cast votes in whole units. In Peoria, Illinois, for example, a
five-seat, five-vote cumulative system has been adopted whereby voters simply identify up to five
candidates for whom they vote and then their five votes are allocated evenly among those
candidates. Larry T. Aspin & William K. Hall, Cumulative Voting and Minority Candidates: An
Analysis of the 1991 Peoria City Council Elections, 17 AM. REV. POL. 225, 226–28 (1996). If a
voter votes for only one candidate, five votes are allocated to that candidate. Id. If a voter votes
for two candidates, then two and one-half votes are allocated to each. Id. If a voter votes for
three, four, or five candidates, then one and two-thirds votes, one and one-fourth votes, or one
vote, respectively, are allocated to each of the chosen candidates. Id. For analyses of CV
elections in Peoria, see id.; Larry T. Aspin, Cumulative Voting and Straight Voting: An Empirical
Comparison, 22 AM. REV. POL. 55 (2001).
32. Engstrom & McDonald, supra note 27, at 386.
33. Id.
34. The successful application of the single-shot strategy depends not only on a group’s
voters complying with it, but also on the other voters dispersing their votes across more
candidates than there are seats to be filled. See id.
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to constitute a plurality of the voters in the entire jurisdiction in order for a
candidate or candidates preferred by it to receive enough votes to finish among
the top N candidates.
An at-large CV system satisfies the basic “one person, one vote” rule, or
individual voter equality requirement, because every voter has the same
number of votes and the same options through which to cast them. Every
voter, in short, is treated equally.35
This alteration in the voting rules within an at-large system, however, can
cleanse the multi-seat format of its tendency to dilute the vote of a minority.
The alteration in the voting rules counters the submergence effect that so often
accompanies the traditional rules, and thereby can provide minority voters with
opportunities to elect representatives of their choice, even when voting occurs
along group lines. These opportunities can be demonstrated theoretically
through a coefficient known as the Threshold of Exclusion.36 This coefficient
identifies the percentage of the electorate that a group must exceed in order to
elect a candidate of its choice regardless of how the rest of the voters vote.37
This coefficient is based on a set of worst-case assumptions, from the minority
group’s perspective, about the behavior of the other voters.38 These
assumptions are:
(1) the other voters cast all of the votes available to them, but
(2) none of their votes are cast for the candidate preferred by the minority
voters, but rather are
(3) concentrated entirely on a number of other candidates equal to the
number of seats to be filled, and are
(4) divided evenly among those other candidates.39
The other voters, in short, are assumed to cast their votes as efficiently as
possible in a multi-seat election.

35. When adopting a CV remedy for a dilutive elective system for the city council in Martin,
SD, in 2007, the District Court stated “Plan C [the CV system] achieves precise population
equality because the entire City of Martin is contained in one district and all voters in that district
receive three votes.” City of Martin, 475 F. Supp. 2d at 939. See also McCoy v. Chi. Heights, 6
F. Supp. 2d 973, 984 (N.D. Ill. 1998) (“By allowing each voter the same number of votes,
cumulative voting subscribes to the one-person, one-vote requirement with numeric exactness.”),
reversed sub nom. on other grounds by Harper v. City of Chi. Heights, 223 F.3d. 593 (7th Cir.
2000).
36. Douglas Rae, Victor Hanby & John Loosemore, Thresholds of Representation and
Thresholds of Exclusion: An Analytic Note on Electoral Systems, 47 COMP. POL. STUD. 479, 480
(1971).
37. Robert R. Brischetto & Richard L. Engstrom, Cumulative Voting and Latino
Representation: Exit Surveys in Fifteen Texas Communities, 78 SOC. SCI. Q. 973, 982 (1997).
38. Id.
39. Id. at 982 n.19.
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The formula for calculating the threshold of exclusion values for CV
systems, expressed as a percentage, is:40
1
———————————— X 100
1 + (Number of Seats)
In a four-seat, four-vote cumulative context, therefore, the threshold of
exclusion is 20.0%. In other words, out of 1,000 voters, if a group constituting
20% + 1, or 201, of the voters chooses to “plump” all of their votes for a
particular candidate, giving him or her 804 votes, then that candidate must win
one of the seats. The other 799 voters could distribute their 3,196 votes evenly
across four other candidates, resulting in each receiving 799 votes. In this
situation, the candidate preferred by the minority will be a winner. If the other
voters deviate from the worst-case assumptions, for example by giving more
votes to one of their choices, then at least one of their other choices would
have fewer votes than 799 and the minority preferred candidate would still win
a seat. Values of the threshold of exclusion for different numbers of seats are
reported in Table 1. As is clear from the table, when the number of seats at
issue in an election increases, the value of the threshold always decreases.
The threshold of exclusion, it must be remembered, identifies the
percentage of the voters in a particular election that a group sharing the same
candidate preference must exceed in order to elect that candidate with no
assistance whatsoever from the other voters.41 If the behavior of other voters
deviates in any way from the worst-case assumptions, then a minority group
may be smaller and/or less cohesive in its preferences and still have a realistic
opportunity to elect a representative or representatives of its choice.42 As the
federal District Court in Dillard v. Chilton County recognized, the threshold of
exclusion for CV systems is “not an automatic cut-off point” for minority
electoral success, but it does serve as a useful guideline.43

40. Id. at 982.
41. Id.
42. In the 1995 CV election for the Olton city council in Texas, for example, a Latino
candidate preferred by Latino voters was elected to one of the two seats at issue despite the Latino
percentage of the turnout being 11% less than the Threshold of Exclusion, 22% versus 33%. Id.
at 984–85. This result was facilitated by Anglo voters concentrating their votes on a particular
Anglo candidate rather than more evenly dividing their vote across two Anglo candidates. Id.
43. Dillard v. Chilton Cnty Bd. of Educ., 699 F. Supp. 870, 875 (M.D. Ala. 1988). The court
noted that “based on a particular jurisdiction’s totality of circumstances, a questioned election
system may very well not be adequate for the jurisdiction, even though the percentage of black
voters in the jurisdiction exceeds the threshold of exclusion for the system; and conversely, the
system may very well be fully adequate in another jurisdiction, even though the percentage of
black voters in the jurisdiction is less than the system’s threshold of exclusion.” Id.
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The ability of minority voters to elect candidates favored by them, but not
by other voters, when cumulative voting rules are used has been documented in
numerous elections. African Americans, Latinos, and Native Americans have
all elected the candidates of their choice under cumulative voting
arrangements.44
It is sometimes suggested that cumulative voting rules are too complicated
for voters to understand and use.45 Allowing voters to cast more than one vote
for a candidate or candidates of their choice, it is alleged, will be a difficult
task for voters, especially for less educated voters.46 This, it is further alleged,
will negate the minority electoral opportunities associated with the system
because minority voters are more likely to be among the less educated than are
white or Anglo voters.47 These allegations have never been backed up with
empirical evidence, however, and studies of cumulative voting elections
demonstrate that they are not valid. The studies cited in notes 44 and 45 show
that minority voters, including African American voters, have understood,
used, and supported the cumulative system in the elections examined.48 And
not only were the minority candidates elected in them the choice of minority
voters, but their elections were almost always attributable to minority voters
actually cumulating their votes on their behalf. This is true for the African
American, Hispanic, and Native American candidates.49

44. Exit polls have provided documentation that, in the elections studied, the minority
candidates that were elected were also the choice of the minority voters. See generally Brischetto
& Engstrom, Cumulative Voting and Latino Representation, supra note 37; Engstrom, Taebel &
Cole, Cumulative Voting as a Remedy for Minority Vote Dilution, supra note 29, at 489; Richard
L. Cole, Richard L. Engstrom & Delbert A. Taebel, Cumulative Voting in a Municipal Election:
A Note on Voter Reactions and Electoral Consequences, 43 W. POL. Q. 191, 196 (1990); Richard
L. Cole & Delbert A. Taebel, Cumulative Voting in Local Elections: Lessons from the
Alamogordo Experience, 73 SOC. SCI. Q. 194, 195 (1992); Richard L. Engstrom & Charles J.
Barrilleaux, Native Americans and Cumulative Voting: The Sisseton Wahpeton Sioux, 72 SOC.
SCI. Q. 388, 388–89 (1991); Richard L. Engstrom, Jason Kirksey & Edward Still, One Person,
Seven Votes: The Cumulative Voting Experience in Chilton County, Alabama, in AFFIRMATIVE
ACTION AND REPRESENTATION: SHAW V. RENO AND THE FUTURE OF VOTING RIGHTS 285, 304–
06 (Anthony Peacock ed., 1997).
45. Richard L. Engstrom & Robert R. Brischetto, Is Cumulative Voting Too Complex?
Evidence from Exit Polls, 27 STETSON L. REV. 813, 817 (1998).
46. Id. at 817–19.
47. See id.
48. For a review of these findings, see Richard L. Engstrom, The Political Thicket, Electoral
Reform, and Minority Voting Rights, in FAIR AND EFFECTIVE REPRESENTATION?: DEBATING
ELECTORAL REFORM AND MINORITY RIGHTS 3, 47–49 (Mark E. Rush & Richard L. Engstrom
eds., 2001).
49. See Brischetto & Engstrom, Cumulative Voting and Latino Representation, supra note
37, at 979; see also Engstrom, Taebel & Cole, Cumulative Voting as a Remedy for Minority Vote
Dilution, supra note 44, at 489–95; Engstrom & Barrilleaux, Native Americans and Cumulative
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Limited Voting

In an at-large limited voting system each voter is given a number of votes
that is less than the number of seats to be filled. In a four-seat election, for
example, voters may be limited to one vote, or two, or even three votes. When
voters receive more than one vote, the usual limit of casting only one vote for
any particular candidate applies. As with cumulative voting, winning
candidates in a limited voting election are determined by a plurality vote rule;
in this example, the four candidates receiving the most votes are each elected
to a seat.
Limited voting provides minority voters with an opportunity to elect
candidates in a multi-seat election by reducing the ability of a cohesive
plurality to win every seat.50 The restriction on the number of votes reduces
the larger group’s ability to submerge the votes of a smaller group. The
smaller the number of votes allocated to each voter, the fewer votes the larger
group has to distribute across the candidates of its choice, and the less
dominant it is likely to be. The more limited the vote compared to the number
of seats, therefore, the greater the minority voters’ opportunity to place a
candidate of their choice among the winners. As with cumulative voting, a
group does not need to constitute a plurality of the voters for its preferred
candidate or candidates to finish among the top number of candidates and win
a seat.
The value of the threshold of exclusion for limited voting systems depends
on both the number of seats to be filled and how limited the vote is.51 The
formula for calculating the threshold of exclusion for limited voting, based on
the same set of worst case assumptions identified above, expressed as a
percentage, is:52
(Number of Votes)
———————————————————— X 100
(Number of Votes) + (Number of Seats)
When the voter is limited to a single vote, as he or she would be in a single
member district arrangement, the threshold of exclusion formula and values for
limited voting are the same as those for cumulative voting, for example, 20.0%
in a four-seat election. In other words, out of 1,000 voters, if a group
constituting 20% + 1, or 201, of the voters chooses to vote for the same

Voting, supra note 44; Engstrom, Kirksey & Still, One Person, Seven Votes, supra note 44, at
306.
50. See Michael S. Kang, Voting as Veto, 108 MICH. L. REV. 1221, 1274 (2010).
51. Richard L. Engstrom, Missing the Target: The Supreme Court, “One Person, One Vote,”
and Partisan Gerrymandering, in REDISTRICTING IN THE NEW MILLENNIUM 313, 331 (Peter F.
Galderisi ed. 2005).
52. Id.
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candidate, giving him or her 201 votes, then that candidate must win one of the
seats. The other 799 voters could distribute their votes evenly across four
other candidates, resulting in each receiving either 200 or 199 votes. In this
situation, the candidate preferred by the minority will be a winner. If the other
voters deviate from the worst case assumptions, for example by giving more
votes to three of their choices, then their fourth choice would have fewer votes
than 199 and the minority preferred candidate would still win a seat. When LV
restricts a voter to a single vote, it offers minorities of voters with equivalent
opportunities, theoretically, to elect representatives of their choice as does CV
(see Table 1).53
Table 1: Threshold of Exclusion Values54

Number
of Seats

Cumulative
Voting

Limited Voting
1 Vote
2 Votes
3 Votes

2

33.3

33.3

___

___

3

25.0

25.0

40.0

___

4

20.0

20.0

33.3

42.9

5

16.7

16.7

28.6

37.5

6

14.3

14.3

25.0

33.3

7

12.5

12.5

22.2

30.0

8

11.1

11.1

20.0

27.3

9

10.0

10.0

18.2

25.0

II. APPLICATIONS TO PORT CHESTER AND EUCLID CSB
Neither cumulative nor limited voting guarantee any particular election
outcome, but they can, depending on the setting and the implementation,
provide minority voters with reasonable opportunities to elect representatives
of their choice.55 The usual procedure for assessing these opportunities is to

53. Id.
54. Author’s calculation based on the formulas described supra.
55. CV and LV are incorrectly referred to by some as “proportional representation” systems.
See, e.g., Abigail Thernstrom, Lani’s Heir: The New Old Racial Ideology of the Holder Justice
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compare a group’s percentage of the Voter Age Population (VAP) or CVAP in
the jurisdiction to the applicable value for the threshold of exclusion, which, as
noted above, varies in a cumulative system with the number of seats to be
filled in an election, and in a limited system with the number of seats to be
filled and the number of votes each voter may cast. In the Euclid CSB case the
number of votes was limited to one, so the value of the threshold in that
arrangement is identical to that for a cumulative system when the number of
seats to be filled is the same.56
The threshold of exclusion, it must be remembered, sets a high bar for
assessing electoral opportunities. It does not identify a floor under which a
group has no chance of electing a representative of its choice, only a floor for
when it can, theoretically, do so without that candidate receiving any votes
from other voters.57 If the worst-case assumptions concerning the voting
behavior of the other voters are violated, and it is hard to imagine an election
in which they are not, the group at issue could be smaller and/or less cohesive
and still elect a representative of its choice. The following provides these
comparisons for the Port Chester and Euclid CSB situations.
A.

Port Chester

The Port Chester election system that was found to violate the VRA was
used to elect a six-member village Board of Trustees.58 All members were
elected at-large to staggered terms, with two members elected every year over
three years.59 The staggered feature of the system, reducing each election to a
two-seat contest, presented a potential problem for the viability of the
cumulative system. The Court concluded, in its decision on liability, that the
staggered elections enhanced the dilutive effect of the at-large system, stating
“it is substantially less likely that white bloc voting could defeat all Hispanic-

Department, NAT’L REV., Dec. 21, 2009, at 34; Cousin v. Sundquist, 145 F.3d 818, 829 (6th Cir.
1998). A proportional representation system is designed to convert the votes of a group into seats
for the group in a proportional manner. Arend Lijphart, Trying to Have the Best of Both Worlds:
Semi-Proportional and Mixed Systems, in CHOOSING AN ELECTORAL SYSTEM: ISSUES AND
ALTERNATIVES 207, 208–11 (Arend Lijphart & Bernard Grofman eds., 1984). CV and LV are
designed instead to counter the “sweep effect” in multi-seat elections, in which one group of
voters tends to win all the seats, that benefits majority groups. DAVID FARRELL, ELECTORAL
SYSTEMS: A COMPARATIVE INTRODUCTION 45–46 (2001). They are properly classified,
therefore, as “semi-proportional,” or even “semi-plurality” systems. Duane A. Cooper, The
Potential of Cumulative Voting to Yield Fair Representation, 19 J. THEORETICAL POL. 277, 280
(2007) (referring to cumulative voting as a “quasi-proportional” system because it “does not
impose quotas on how a population should be represented in an elected body.”).
56. United States v. Euclid City Sch. Bd., 632 F. Supp. 2d 740, 755 (N.D. Ohio 2009).
57. Engstrom, Missing the Target, supra note 51, at 331.
58. United States v. Vill. of Port Chester, 704 F. Supp. 2d 411, 416 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
59. Id. at 434.
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preferred candidates if all six trustees were chosen at one time.”60 The same
would be true, in the Port Chester context, if cumulative voting elections were
for six rather than for two seats at a time.61
Table 2 contains information comparing the Latino percentage of the
CVAP in Port Chester to the threshold of exclusion for each proposed remedy.
Identified in the first column of Table 2 are the different values of the
threshold of exclusion for each electoral context. Reported in the second
column is the Latino percentage of the CVAP in each context, the village itself
and each of the SMDs in the plaintiff’s proposed districting plan, as of the
2000 Census. The third column contains the estimated Latino CVAP
percentage, based on the 2006 estimates provided by the plaintiff’s expert, in
the jurisdiction and the districts proposed by DOJ. The fourth and fifth
columns identify the percentage of the relevant threshold of exclusion values
that the Latino CVAP constituted, the first based on the 2000 census and the
second on the 2006 estimates.
The percentage of the CVAP that Latinos constituted in Port Chester, as of
2006, was estimated to be 27.5% (the corresponding figure from the 2000
Census was 21.9). The value of the threshold of exclusion for a two-seat
cumulative voting election is larger than that, 33.3% (see Table 1). However,
if all six board members were elected in a single cumulative voting election,
the opportunity Latinos would have to elect a representative of their choice
would be greatly enhanced. The threshold of exclusion value for a six-seat
cumulative arrangement is 14.3%, considerably lower than the two-seat
threshold (see Table 1). Latino CVAP in 2006 was almost twice the size of
that threshold (192.3%, see Table 2 column five). The village’s proposed
remedy therefore was to eliminate the staggered terms and elect all six
Trustees in a single at-large cumulative voting election every three years.62

60. Id. at 444.
61. A negative effect of staggered terms on the election of Latino candidates to local
governing boards in CV elections in Texas has been reported by Brischetto & Engstrom,
Cumulative Voting and Latino Representation, supra note 37, at 988–89. See also SHAUN
BOWLER, TODD DONOVAN & DAVID BROCKINGTON, ELECTORAL REFORM AND MINORITY
REPRESENTATION 105 (2003).
62. Vill. of Port Chester, 704 F. Supp. 2d at 416.
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Table 2: Threshold of Exclusion Values, Six-Vote Cumulative System and
Proposed Majority-Hispanic Single Member Districts, Port Chester63

Threshold
of Exclusion

CVAP
2000

CVAP
2006 est.

14.3

21.9

27.5

153.1

192.3

1

50.0

8.7

10.2

17.4

20.4

2

50.0

9.6

19.6

19.2

39.2

3

50.0

27.2

34.6

54.4

69.2

4

50.0

56.3

70.4

112.6

140.8

5

50.0

24.7

31.4

49.4

62.8

6

50.0

29.7

31.9

59.4

63.8

Cumulative Voting

CVAP as %
of threshold
2000 2006

Plaintiff’s Districts

A comparison of the threshold of exclusion value for a six vote cumulative
election offered Latinos, at least theoretically, a better opportunity to elect a
representative of their choice than the Latino SMD district advocated by the
DOJ,64 which was estimated to be 70.4% in CVAP.65 The threshold value for a
single member district is 50.0, as it takes a majority of the voters in a SMD to
guarantee the election of a candidate. The village-wide CVAP was almost
twice as high as the cumulative voting threshold, and exceeded that threshold
by about 50 percentage points more than the proposed Latino district exceeded

63. For the threshold of exclusion in the cumulative voting context, see supra Table 1. For
columns two and three, see Reply Affidavit of Prof. Andrew Beveridge at 11, Vill. of Port
Chester, 704 F. Supp. 2d 411 (No. 06-15173), ECF No. 49. Columns four and five are calculated
by the author.
64. See Richard L. Engstrom, Report on Citizen Voting Age Deviations in Plaintiffs’
Proposed Single Member District Plan at 7, Vill. of Port Chester, 704 F. Supp. 2d 411 (No. 0615173) (on file with author).
65. Reply Affidavit of Prof. Andrew Beveridge, supra note 63, at 11.
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that for a SMD (192.3 – 140.8). This reflects the fact that an estimated 82.5
percent of the Latino CVAP resided outside the Latino district.66
The fact that the estimated CVAP in the village was almost twice the
threshold value for a cumulative voting election reveals that the village’s
proposal would also, theoretically, provide Latinos with a much better
opportunity to elect two representatives of their choice to the board than would
the plaintiff’s districting plan. The second highest CVAP percentage in a
district within that plan, as of 2006, was 34.6%, which was 69.2% of the
threshold for a SMD. If the Latino CVAP in Port Chester continued to grow
relative to that of non-Latinos, as expected,67 the Latino opportunity to elect
two members would grow with it. There would be no need to wait for a new
districting plan, after a new census, to create a second Latino opportunity
district, if it could be done even then.
B.

Euclid CSB

The Euclid City School District is governed by a five-member body
elected through staggered elections, three members being elected one year and
two the other.68 After stipulating to the dilutive effect of its at-large system,
the board proposed that either cumulative voting or limited voting with each
voter having one vote be the remedy for the dilutive effects.69 Unlike in Port
Chester, the staggered system in Euclid did not have to be disturbed because
the estimated African American percentage of the CVAP, based on the 2007
Annual Community Survey, exceeded the threshold of exclusion value for both
a three-seat election and a two-seat election.70 Reasonable opportunities to
elect a representative of their choice therefore would be provided in each of the
staggered elections.
Table 3 contains the information comparing the relative presence of
African Americans of voting age in Euclid to the threshold of exclusion for
each proposed remedy. As with Table 2, identified in the first column of Table
3 are the different values of the threshold of exclusion for each electoral
context. Reported in the second column is the African American percentage of
the VAP in each context, the school district itself and each of the SMDs in the
plaintiff’s proposed districting plan, as of the 2000 Census. The third column

66. The plaintiff’s expert estimated the Latino CVAP in 2006 to be 3,929. Id. After
subtracting the 686 estimated to reside in the Latino district (district No. 4), 3,243 (82.5%) of the
Latino CVAP remain. See id.
67. Declaration of Andrew A. Beveridge, supra note 7, at 4–6.
68. United States v. Euclid City Sch. Bd., 632 F. Supp. 2d 740, 746 (N.D. Ohio 2009).
69. Id. at 744–45.
70. Id. at 745. This estimate is based on data collected from January 2005 through
December 2007. It was the latest estimate provided by the Census Bureau at the time of the
remedial hearing.
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contains the estimated African American percentage of the VAP in the
jurisdiction in 2007. No estimates for any year later than 2000 were provided
for the districts in the Plaintiff’s plan. The fourth and fifth columns identify
the percentage of the relevant threshold of exclusion values that the African
American VAP constituted, the first based on the 2000 census and the second
on the 2007 estimate.
Revealed in the fourth column is the fact that the African American voting
age population in Euclid in 2000 was 27.8% and that this percentage exceeded
the threshold of exclusion value for the Board’s proposed cumulative and
limited voting systems when three seats are up for election. African
Americans of voting age exceed that threshold by 11.2%. Likewise, African
American VAP exceeded that threshold in District 1 in the Plaintiff’s proposed
single member district plan. In this context, they exceed the threshold by
22.0%. Based on the 2000 Census, both the Plaintiff and the Board clearly
provide a reasonable opportunity for African Americans to elect a candidate of
their choice.
Also revealed in column four is that African Americans have a better
chance of electing a second candidate of their choice under the Board’s
proposals. The African American percentage of the threshold of exclusion for
these proposals in the other election, the two-seat election, is 83.5. In contrast,
the second most African American district in the Plaintiff’s plan is District 2,
in which the African American voting age percentage is 31.3. This is only
62.6% of the threshold value, 50.0%, for a single member district. The
opportunity to elect a second person to the Board in 2000 would have been
better therefore under the Board’s proposal than that of the Plaintiff.

Table 3: Threshold of Exclusion Values, Three-Seat and Two-Seat
Elections71
Threshold
of Exclusion

VAP
2000

VAP
2007 est.

VAP as %
of threshold
2000 2007

Three seats

25.0

27.8

40.2

111.2

160.8

Two seats

33.3

27.8

40.2

83.5

120.7

Cumulative and
Limited Proposals

71. For column one see supra Table 1. For column two, see Lisa Handley, Expert Report at
3, Euclid City Sch. Bd., 632 F. Supp. 2d 740 (No. 08-2832), ECF No. 19-2. For column 3, see
Euclid City Sch. Bd., 632 F. Supp. 2d at 745.
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Single Member
District Proposal
Dist 1

50.0

61.0

—

122.0

—

Dist 2

50.0

31.3

—

62.6

—

Dist 3

50.0

21.1

—

42.2

—

Dist 4

50.0

17.0

—

34.0

—

Dist 5

50.0

9.1

—

18.2

—

The American Community Survey indicates that the African American
VAP had grown relative to that of the other residents in Euclid since 2000.
The Census Bureau’s latest estimate of the African American percentage of the
VAP at the time of trial was that for 2007, and was 40.2%. Under the Board’s
proposals, African Americans would clearly have a reasonable chance to elect
two representatives of their choice. As revealed in column five, not only is the
threshold for the three-seat election now exceeded by the African American
VAP percentage by over 60%, but the threshold for the two-seat election is
exceeded by over 20%. The African American estimate of the voting age
population exceeds the threshold for the two-seat election by 20.7%, only 1.3%
less than the African American VAP in District 1 exceeded that for a single
member district using the 2000 Census figures.
Both of the proposed remedies chosen by the Board provided African
Americans in Euclid with reasonable opportunities to elect two representatives
of their choice, including fellow African Americans if they are the African
American voters’ choices. Without more recent figures for the districts in the
Plaintiff’s plan, it is not known whether the same can be said for its single
member districting arrangement.
The Board’s remedies would not confine the opportunity to elect to just
those African American voters who reside within an African American
opportunity district. Based on the 2000 Census figures, more than half
(56.0%) of the African American VAP in Euclid resided outside the Plaintiff’s
District 1.72 The dilutive effect of the current at-large election format,
however, is across the entire school district. Cumulative or limited voting
would provide a remedy that matches the jurisdiction-wide violation. It would
allow all of the African Americans to participate in the opportunity to elect.

72. The plaintiff’s expert stated the African American VAP in 2000 was 11,415. See Lisa
Handley, Expert Report, supra note 71, at 3. After subtracting the 5,019 African Americans of
voting age who reside in the African American district (district No. 1), 6,396 (56.0%) of the
African American VAP remains. See id.
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Under the Board’s proposed remedy, based on the 2007 estimate, the threshold
of exclusion is exceeded by over 60% in the election when three seats are to be
filled, and over 20% in the election when two seats are to be filled.
III. OTHER REASONS TO PREFER CUMULATIVE OR LIMITED VOTING OVER
DISTRICT ELECTIONS
There are reasons for a jurisdiction to prefer cumulative or limited voting
over SMDs other than the minority electoral opportunities they provide. One
is that these remedies match the dilution problem sometimes present in at-large
election systems. Minority vote dilution in an at-large system is a jurisdictionwide problem; it affects all minority voters residing within a jurisdiction, not
just those residing in a particular area that can provide the basis for a majorityminority SMD. In Port Chester, the DOJ’s proposed remedy for the dilution
left 82.5% of the estimated Latino CVAP in 2006 outside the majority-Latino
district (59.0% based on the 2000 census).73 In the Euclid CSB, 56.0% of the
African American VAP remained outside the DOJ’s majority-African
American district (based on the 2000 census).74 CV and LV provide all of the
minority group’s voters in a jurisdiction, regardless of where they reside, with
an opportunity to participate in electing a representative of the group’s choice,
rather than just those residing in the majority-minority district. It would
certainly be a rational policy choice to allow all of the minority voters to
participate in the opportunity to elect representatives favored by their group.
In addition, voters in CV and LV systems can choose representatives,
including those from within their group, from anywhere in the jurisdiction,
rather than among those residing in a restricted geographic area. These
systems do not preclude the election of candidates from particular areas of a
jurisdiction if that is important to the voters. CV and LV rules allow voters to
form “voluntary constituencies” with other like-minded voters. If geography is
an important criterion to the voters they are free to vote along those lines.
Neither CV nor LV entail a geographical constraint, as districts do. They leave
it up to the voters to decide whether having a representative who lives close to
them is important. These systems allow “communities defined by actual
shared interests”75 to be determined by the voters, rather than those who draw,
or adopt, district lines.76 Allowing voters in a jurisdiction to form voting

73. See supra note 66.
74. See supra note 72.
75. Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 916 (1995).
76. The concept of “communities of interest” is a so-called “traditional” districting criterion,
but also an extremely ambiguous one. There is no widely agreed upon definition, identification
procedure, or measurement of the concept, nor established priorities concerning which
“communities” are more important to protect within a districting plan than others. There is also
no reason why communities that are geographically concentrated should be protected by an
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communities based on their shared interests, including, but not limited to, those
based on geographical proximity, in a nondilutive election system is also a
rational policy choice.77
Another feature of districting plans gaining increased attention is the large
disparity that can occur across districts in VAP or CVAP.78 This has been the
case especially when districts are drawn to provide electoral opportunities to a
Latino minority. Port Chester provides a useful example of this. The plan
proposed by the DOJ satisfied the “one person, one vote” criterion based on
total population, which has been the criterion employed to-date in the
redistricting of virtually all legislative bodies of general purpose governments,
and of school boards. Total population deviations in the plan ranged from 70
people below the average district deviation in the smallest district to 86 above
it in the largest.79 In percentage terms, these were -1.84 and +1.50,80 for a total
combined deviation of 3.34, well under the frequently relied upon rule of
thumb of less than 10.
However, the village noted that the one person, one vote standard was not
satisfied if it is based on CVAP. The disparities in CVAP across the districts
were primarily a function of the low CVAP in the majority-Latino district in
the plan, which was estimated to be 975 as of 2006.81 The other five districts

election system while groups that are more geographically dispersed are not. See Engstrom, The
Political Thicket, Electoral Reform, and Minority Voting Rights, supra note 48, at 25–30.
77. In addition, CV and LV would not require redistricting after every census, and possibly
more frequently, given the U.S. Supreme Court’s acceptance of the redistricting of congressional
districts in 2003 in Texas. See generally League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S.
399 (2006). Changes in population and demographics will be accounted for naturally in any atlarge system, and therefore the usually contentious process of redistricting, often followed by
expensive litigation, will be avoided. See generally Richard L. Engstrom, The Post-2000 Round
of Redistricting: An Entangled Thicket within the Federal System, 32 PUBLIUS: THE J. OF
FEDERALISM 51 (2002).
78. See generally Joshua M. Rosenberg, Defining Population for One Person, One Vote, 42
LOY. L.A. L. REV. 709 (2009); Stacy Robyn Harold, The Right to Representation and the Census:
Is it Permissible for Congress to Exclude Illegal Immigrants from the Apportionment Base?, 53
WAYNE L. REV. 921 (2007); Edward Blum, Are We a Nation of One Person, One Vote, THE AM.
(Mar. 11, 2010), http://www.american.com/archive/2010/march/are-we-a-nation-of-one-personone-vote; Hans A. von Spakovsky, The Left’s Pernicious Redistricting Strategy, NAT’L REV. ONLINE (Feb. 17, 2010),
http://www.nationalreview.com/corner/194979/lefts-perniciousredistricting-strategy/hans-von-spakovsky; Hans A. von Spakovsky, Re: One Person, One Vote,
NAT’L REV. ON-LINE (Feb. 19, 2010), http://www.nationalreview.com/corner/195155/re-oneperson-one-vote/hans-von-spakovsky.
79. Reply Affidavit of Prof. Andrew Beveridge, supra note 63, at 11.
80. United States v. Vill. of Port Chester, 704 F. Supp. 2d 411, 421 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). In the
opinion, the direction of these deviations, + or –, is reported incorrectly. See Reply Affidavit of
Prof. Andrew Beveridge, supra note 63, at 11.
81. Reply Affidavit of Prof. Andrew Beveridge, supra note 63, at 11.
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ranged from 2,014 to 3,122 in CVAP, and averaged 2,657.82 The smallest
district in CVAP, the Latino district, was 58.98% below the average CVAP for
a district, and the largest district was 31.36% above, for a combined deviation
of 90.34.83 The average deviation was 25.78%.84 These CVAP deviations
were considerably higher than those in the districts for the U.S. House of
Representatives in New York, the state Assembly and Senate, the New York
City Council, and several other municipalities.85
Total population has served as the basis for assessing equality in the size of
districts within a districting plan. The Supreme Court has relied on total
population counts numerous times while reviewing whether districting plans
comply with the one person, one vote rule.86 It has not said, in any of these
cases, that CVAP should be used for this purpose. But then it has not
addressed this issue specifically. Three federal appeals courts have opined on
it, however, and are divided. In Garza v. County of Los Angeles, the Ninth
Circuit held in a two to one decision in 1990 that the use of CVAP to assess
compliance with the one person, one vote rule would violate the equal
protection rights of Hispanics.87 The Fourth and Fifth Circuits have held that it
is a determination to be made by the political process, rather than courts. In
these circuits, districting by CVAP appears to be an option.88

82. Id.
83. Engstrom, Report on Citizen Voting Age Deviations, supra note 64, at 5.
84. Id. at 4.
85. The sizes of the CVAP disparities are reported in Richard Engstrom’ s Report. Id. This
criticism of plaintiffs’ illustrative single member districting plans in Section 2 challenges to atlarge elections has been made recently in at least three cases involving local governments in
Texas. See Reyes v. City of Farmers Branch, Tx., No. 3:07-CV-900-O, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
89599 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 4, 2008) (issue not addressed); Benavidez v. City of Irving, Tx., 638 F.
Supp. 2d 709, 714 (N.D. Tex. 2009) (finding total population is “entirely appropriate” for
assessing compliance with the population equality requirement); Benavidez v. Irving Indep. Sch.
Dist., 690 F. Supp. 2d 451 (N.D. Tex. 2010) (issue not addressed). For the size of the disparities
in these cases, see John Alford, Expert Report at 3–5, in Appendix to City’s Motion for Summary
Judgment, Reyes, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 89599 (No. 07-900), ECF No. 18; John Alford, Expert
Report at 7–9, City of Irving, 638 F. Supp. 2d 709 (No. 07-01850); John Alford, Expert Report at
5–6, Irving Indep. Sch. Dist., 690 F. Supp. 2d 451 (No. 08-0924) (on file with PUBLIC LAW
REVIEW).
86. See GERALD HEBERT ET AL., THE REALIST’S GUIDE TO REDISTRICTING: AVOIDING THE
LEGAL PITFALLS 8–10 (1st ed. 2000).
87. Garza v. County of L.A., 918 F.2d 763, 775–76 (9th Cir. 1990). Proponents of
districting based on CVAP heavily reference the dissent by Judge Alex Kozinski on this issue.
See, e.g., Blum, supra note 78; Rosenberg, supra note 78, at 722–25.
88. In Daly v. Hunt, a case involving districts for the Mechlenburg County, North Carolina,
Board of Commissioners and Board of Education, the Fourth Circuit held that the choice of total
population or voting age population as the basis for district equality “is quintessentially a decision
that should be made by the state, not the federal courts, in the inherently political and legislative
process of apportionment. Daly v. Hunt, 93 F.3d 1212, 1227 (4th Cir. 1996). In Chen v. City of
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The court in Port Chester noted that, in a districting context, this issue
“raises important legal questions deserving of full analysis.”89 The Court
deemed it unnecessary to address this issue, however, because it was not
relevant to the city-wide CV system the Court approved.90 Regardless of how
the total population versus CVAP issue is ultimately resolved, avoiding VAP
or CVAP disparities in a districting plan the size of those in Port Chester, for
example, when a CV or LV arrangement could provide a protected group with
a comparable, or even better, opportunity to elect a candidate or candidates of
its choice, would be another rational reason to adopt one of those systems.91
IV. JUDICIAL RESPONSE
As noted above, when at-large election systems have been found to dilute
the votes of protected minorities in violation of Section 2 of the VRA, and
plaintiffs and defendants settle the remedy issue by agreeing to CV or LV,
those settlements have been approved by federal courts.92 When plaintiffs
propose these remedies but defendants do not favor them, courts have refused

Houston, a case involving city council districts, the Fifth Circuit held likewise that whether
districts should be based on total population or CVAP was a “close question”, but that without
more guidance from the Supreme Court concluded that “this eminently political question has been
left to the political process.” Chen v. City of Houston, 206 F.3d 502, 528 (5th Cir. 2000), cert.
denied, 532 U.S 1046 (2001). The only Supreme Court Justice in favor of granting review on the
total population versus CVAP issue was Clarence Thomas, who wrote, “[w]e have never
determined the relevant ‘population’ that States and localities must equally distribute among their
districts.” Id. at 1047 (Thomas, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
89. United States v. Vill. of Port Chester, 704 F. Supp. 2d 411, 421 n.5 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
90. Id.
91. The issue was again before a federal district court recently, in Texas. After the at-large
election system used to elect the council in the City of Irving was found to violate section 2 of the
VRA, Benavidez v. City of Irving, Tx., 638 F. Supp. 2d 709, 732 (N.D. Tex. 2009), the remedial
issue was settled by the adoption of a mixed election format, with seats filled by both at-large and
SMD elections. Original Complaint at 1, Lepak v. City of Irving, No. 3:10-CV-00277-P (N.D.
Tex. Feb. 11, 2010), ECF No. 1. The six SMDs in the remedy, drawn based on total population,
were challenged for violating the one person, one vote principle because one district, the majority
Latino district, contains an estimated CVAP of 13,029, while two others have CVAPs estimated
to be 22,932 and 23,884. Id. at 4, 5. This challenge was rejected however when the court granted
summary judgment to the city in Lepak v. City of Irvine, No. 3:10-CV-0277-P (N.D. Tex. Feb.
11, 2011). In addition, a complaint has been filed in another federal district court in Texas
claiming that the inclusion of “undocumented immigrants” in the population counts for
redistricting the state’s U.S. House districts, Texas Senate and House districts, and state School
Board of Education districts results in “inaccurate” counts in violation of the several provisions of
the U.S. Constitution, Texas Constitution, and section 2 of the Voting Rights Act. Plaintiffs’
Original Complaint and Request for Injunctive and Declaratory Relief, and Designation of a
Three-Judge Court, Teuber v. State of Texas, No. 4:11-CV-00059 (E.D. Tex. Feb. 10, 2011).
92. For recent examples, see Judgment and Order Modifying Consent Decree, supra note 23,
at 2; Consent Judgment and Decree, supra note 23, at 4.
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to impose them.93 Some courts have made it clear that the refusal is not driven
by objections to the systems themselves, but rather by the deference courts are
supposed to give to the remedial preferences of the jurisdictions, provided their
preferred remedies are not dilutive themselves.94 And recently, a court has
adopted a CV system preferred by plaintiffs when the defendant refused to
offer a remedy.95
Port Chester and Euclid CSB appear to be the first instances, however, in
which the defendants proposed CV or LV as a remedy and plaintiffs objected,
in both cases favoring a SMD arrangement. In the remedy stage of section 2
litigation under the VRA, courts are to examine the defendant’s proposed
remedy first and accord it a high level of deference. As the Court in Port
Chester stated, “[t]he Court must give the defendant jurisdiction the first
opportunity to suggest a legally acceptable remedial plan, based on the theory
that the judiciary should not intrude on legislative policy any more than
necessary.”96 The court in Euclid CSB commented that “[u]ndoubtedly, it is a
‘curious doctrine that allows the foxes, once challenged, to tell this Court that
it must accept their plan for protecting and assuring the rights of the hens.’ It
is, however, the doctrine this Court is compelled to apply.”97 While the
traditional remedy has been a SMD arrangement, these cases make clear that
the deference to defendants’ proposals does not vary with the type of remedy
offered, as long as the courts find they cleanse the dilution found in the
challenged at-large arrangement.
A.

Euclid CSB

The court in Euclid CSB, in April of 2009, provided the required level of
deference to the limited voting proposal by the school board.98 It stated, in
very clear language, that it was “not to inquire whether the Board’s proposal is
the ‘best’ possible proposal, or even to weigh the Board’s proposal against
other possibilities to see if it could somehow be made ‘better.’”99 It viewed its
discretion as far more limited; “[a] district court may reject the defendant’s

93. See, e.g., Cane v. Worcester Cnty., 35 F.3d 921, 927, 929 (4th Cir. 1994).
94. E.g., Harper v. City of Chi. Heights, 223 F.3d 593, 601–02 (7th Cir. 2000); Cane v.
Worcester Cnty., 35 F.3d 921, 928–29 (4th Cir. 1994).
95. Cottier v. City of Martin, 475 F. Supp. 2d 932, 936 (D.S.D. 2007), vacated on other
grounds, Cottier v. City of Martin, 604 F.3d 553 (8th Cir. 2010).
96. United States v. Vill. of Port Chester, 704 F. Supp. 2d 411, 447 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
97. United States v. Euclid City Sch. Bd., 632 F. Supp. 2d 740, 750 (N.D. Ohio 2009)
(quoting Henderson v. Bd. of Supervisors, No. 87-0560-R, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16729, at *13
(E.D. Va. June 6, 1988)).
98. Id. The court also found that, given the stipulation as to liability, as well as its findings
in City of Euclid and the fact that no African American had ever been elected to the Board, the atlarge election arrangement violated section 2. Id. at 754–55.
99. Id. at 770.
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proposal under only one condition: if that proposal ‘is legally unacceptable
because it violates anew constitutional or statutory voting rights.’”100
The court found the one vote limited arrangement for school board
elections in Euclid to be a “valid remedy,” one that would “give minorities the
opportunity to elect minority candidates” if they were their choice.101 The
court stressed that the standard was one of “meaningful opportunity,” not a
guaranteed result.102 The court noted its findings in the Euclid City Council
case that African Americans in Euclid had participated in elections at a much
lower rate than non-African Americans in the past.103 To satisfy itself that the
opportunity would be meaningful, it supplemented its comparison of the
threshold of exclusion values and the African American VAP in the district
with a consideration of “the existing political realities of the district.”104 It
therefore undertook its own viability analysis of the one vote limited
remedy.105
The court noted that in the context of SMDs, some courts had adopted a
60% VAP standard as the cutoff for a viable minority district.106 The court
also noted this was, in effect, the standard used by the plaintiff in its own
remedial proposal; the African American percentage of the VAP in the only
majority-African American district in that plan, which plaintiff described as an
“opportunity” district, was just above 60%.107 Quoting from its decision in the
Euclid City Council case, in which an SMD remedy was adopted, the court
stated, “[g]enerally, it is clear that ‘a district gives minorities a reasonable
opportunity to elect candidates of choice where it has a sufficient cushion of
approximately 60% of the voting-age population.’”108 The court then
compared the LV remedy to the 60% standard, and determined that it
compared favorably with it.109
The Board’s expert witness had pointed out at trial that a 60% African
American VAP district would constitute 120% of the threshold of exclusion
100. Id. at 750 (emphasis added) (quoting McGhee v. Granville Cnty., 860 F.2d 110, 115 (4th
Cir. 1988)).
101. Id. at 752. The court cited its language in the City of Euclid decision that “[t]he Voting
Rights Act’s guarantee of equal opportunity is not met when candidates favored by blacks can
win, but only if the candidates are white.” Id. (quoting United States v. City of Euclid, 580 F.
Supp. 2d 584, 597 (N.D. Ohio 2008)).
102. Id. at 744, 752, 763 (emphasis added).
103. Euclid City Sch. Bd., 632 F. Supp. 2d at 746.
104. Id. at 763.
105. See id. at 769.
106. The court relied most notably on Ketchum v. Byrne, 740 F.2d 1398, 1415 (7th Cir.
1984). Euclid City Sch. Bd., 632 F. Supp. 2d at 768.
107. Id. at 769.
108. Id. at 768 (quoting United States v. City of Euclid, 523 F. Supp. 2d 641, 645 (N.D. Ohio
2007)).
109. Id. at 769.
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value for a SMD, which is 50%.110 The 2007 estimate of the citywide African
American VAP in Euclid, 40.2%, would itself constitute 161% of that
threshold in the three-seat LV election, and 121% in the two-seat election.111
A citywide LV system therefore exceeded the threshold of exclusion for a 60%
district by roughly 40% in the three-seat context, and was essentially the same
in the two-seat context (see Table 3 above). The opportunity for African
Americans to elect a representative or representatives of their choice in the LV
system proposed by the defendant was therefore “comparable or better,” the
expert opined, than that offered by a 60% district.112
The court undertook its own analysis that inevitably reached the same
conclusion. The court noted that the 60% standard for a SMD assumes that
minority participation in a district would be two-thirds that of the other
voters.113 The court concluded that a two-thirds guideline, given both the past
turnout disparities in city council elections and growing African American
presence in Euclid, would also be an appropriate standard for assessing
whether the limited voting remedy would provide a “sufficient cushion” to
provide African Americans with a reasonable opportunity to elect a candidate
of their choice.114 Applying the two-thirds assumption to the estimated 40%
African American VAP in Euclid in 2007, the court found that African
Americans would constitute 27% of the voters.115 This figure exceeded the
value of the threshold of exclusion for a three-seat limited voting election, 25,
and therefore was “enough to elect one candidate” to the board.116 The court
also noted that if the African Americans were to turnout at 85% the rate of the
other voters, they “would be able to elect two candidates” because that would

110. Transcript 19MY09 Euclid Hearing at 24:14–17, Euclid City Sch. Bd., 632 F. Supp. 2d
740 (No. 08-2832).
111. Id. at 22:14–17, 31:25.
112. Id. at 24:14–20.
113. The court illustrated this by use of a hypothetical district with a voting-age population of
100, of whom 60 are minority group members. Euclid City Sch. Bd., 632 F. Supp. 2d at 769 n.28.
If all 40 of the non-African Americans of voting age voted, they would cast 40 votes. Id. If the
minority turnout is two-thirds of that of the non-African Americans, then 40 African Americans
also would vote (60 x .667 = 40.02 voters). Id.
114. Id. at 769. As part of this determination, the court recognized that “it is unreasonable to
assume that minority turnout will not increase under a system in which that turnout is made
meaningful, relative to a system in which that turnout was entirely ineffective.” Id. at 765.
115. Id. at 770. The court was mistaken at this point. Again, assuming a VAP of 100, but
now 40 of whom are African American and 60 are not African American, it would actually be
31% of the voters; [27 African American voters / (27 African American voters + 60 other voters)]
= 31% of the voters.
116. Id. According to the court, the threshold of exclusion for a three-seat election is 25%.
Id. at 770 n.30. The correct percentage, as explained in note 115, supra, is 31, not 27, which is
even further above the 25% threshold.
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exceed the threshold of exclusion for a two-seat election as well.117 The court
therefore concluded that limited voting would provide Euclid’s African
Americans with a “meaningful opportunity” to participate in school board
elections, but noted that African American turnout would need to increase in
order to take “full advantage” of it.118 Given that this opportunity was present
while the elections were staggered, the court declined to require that elections
for all seats be simultaneous.119
The school district had proposed that either CV or LV with a one vote limit
serve as the remedy.120 At the beginning of the remedial phase the district had
expressed a preference for CV, but given the threshold of exclusion values are
identical for the two, by the end of the hearing it expressed no preference
between them.121 This may have been because the other defendant in the case,
the Cuyahoga County Board of Elections, was maintaining that it could not
readily implement cumulative voting using its current election software, but it
could do so for a one-vote limited scheme.122 In addition, the DOJ stated on
the final day of trial that if the remedy was not to be its SMD plan, it preferred
a one vote limited over cumulative arrangement, with all five seats elected
simultaneously, and suggested that this be used on an interim basis and
revisited following the 2010 census.123
The court chose the one vote limited option.124 It noted that LV and CV
have the “same theoretical effect” on minority opportunities to elect
representatives of their choice.125 The preference for LV was based on
practical considerations: its “use throughout Ohio,” whereas CV was
“currently unknown in the State”; the substantial difficulty in implementing
cumulative voting, according to the Cuyahoga County Board of Elections,

117. Id. at 770. If it is assumed that African Americans of voting age vote at two-thirds the
rate of the non-African Americans of voting age, the African American percentage of the voters
would be 31, only 2.3% below the threshold value of 33.3. Id. at 770 n.32.
118. Id. at 770. The court noted that would also be true if the remedy was the plaintiff’s SMD
plan. Id. at 770 n.33.
119. See Euclid City Sch. Bd., 632 F. Supp. 2d at 770–71.
120. Id. at 744.
121. The School Board’s attorney explained to the court that the initial preference for CV was
based on the fact that voters in School Board elections under CV would be allocated a number of
votes equal to the number of seats up for election, as they had been in the past, and stated “[b]ut
beyond that, because of the fact that one vote limited in this situation provides the same
opportunity to elect a minority preferred candidate, the fact that cumulative voting was listed first
and limited second is almost a toss-up.” Hearing Transcript at 216, Euclid City Sch. Bd., 632 F.
Supp. 2d 740 (No. 08-2832), ECF No. 43.
122. See id. at 173–75, 189, 204–06.
123. Id. at 257–59. The DOJ suggested the implementation of its SMD plan on the same
interim basis as well. Id. at 264.
124. Euclid City Sch. Bd., 632 F. Supp. 2d at 757.
125. Id. at 755.
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compared to the one vote limited arrangement, which would create “no
additional burden”; and that CV was “a more difficult concept (than LV) for
voters to understand.”126
As noted above, the court had made clear that it had narrow discretion on
the choice of a remedy. It stated that “[a]s a matter of law, the particular
reasons that the Board might have for its preference is not of overwhelming
importance.”127 But it also stated that, “[a]s a practical matter, however, it is
the better practice for a district court to acknowledge the non-discriminatory
reasons that underlie a defendant’s proposal where, as here, the Plaintiff
challenges that proposal’s compliance with Section 2.”128 On this matter the
court relied, as did the school board, on an amicus curiae brief provided by the
Ohio School Board Association (OSBA).129
It was argued in the OSBA brief that two important dimensions of the
Euclid CSB election system are widely viewed as “good government” features
for school governance: at-large elections and staggered terms.130 At-large
elections make school board members electorally accountable, at least
formally, to all voters in a school district. This, the OSBA argued, impedes
school board members from favoring particular schools in a jurisdiction, and
facilitates collaborative behavior on the part of board members.131 Staggered
terms are designed to promote continuity in school governance. Wholesale
turnover in board membership is not possible, at least through elections.
“Gradual turnover,” the OSBA argued, is to be preferred when it comes to
school governance.132 It also argued that SMDs would politicize education
governance, making it difficult to attract candidates, especially quality
candidates, for school board elections.133 The court noted that the DOJ did not
challenge any of these non-discriminatory reasons for the preference for atlarge and staggered elections, and the court itself found them to provide
“legitimate, non-discriminatory justifications.”134 The court also referenced
126. Id. at 756. The extensive use of the LV system in Ohio was not documented in any way
other than the statements by the Director of the Bd. of Elections and the attorney for that Board.
Further research is needed to verify that these statements were referring to the same LV
arrangement proposed by the School Board.
127. Id. at 757.
128. Id.
129. Id. (citing Brief for Ohio School Boards Association as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Defendant, Euclid City Sch. Bd., 632 F. Supp. 2d 740 (No. 08-2832), ECF No. 22).
130. See Brief for Ohio School Boards Association as Amicus Curiae Supporting Defendant,
supra note 129, at 6–7, 10–11.
131. Id. at 9.
132. Id. at 10.
133. Id. at 11–12.
134. Euclid City Sch. Bd., 632 F. Supp. 2d at 759. While the OSBA’s brief was written in
support of a CV remedy, then preferred by the Euclid CSB, the justifications would apply to LV
as well.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2010]

CUMULATIVE AND LIMITED VOTING

123

one other reason to support a nondilutive at-large arrangement over SMDs,
which was that “at-large voting also prevents ‘communities of interest’ that
may be developed around school-related issues” from being arbitrarily divided
by district lines.135
B.

United States v. Village of Port Chester

The federal court in United States v. Village of Port Chester issued a
Summary Order in November of 2009 adopting the defendant’s proposed
remedy of cumulative voting without staggered terms.136 It stated, as had the
court in Euclid CSB, that it was obligated to accept the village’s preference as
long as it was legally acceptable, and held that it was.137 In support of its
decision, the court recognized that the Latino CVAP in Port Chester exceeded
the threshold of exclusion for the six-vote CV system “by a large enough
margin to suggest that Hispanics could prevail without voting 100%
cohesively,” and that “experiences from other jurisdictions that use cumulative
voting show that minority communities are able to take advantage of their
voting power under cumulative voting to elect the representative of their
choice.”138 It rescheduled the next village election from March 2010 to June
2010 in order to give the village time to educate the voters about the new
voting system and mandated the parties draft a Consent Decree providing
details about the implementation of the new system.139
The court followed its order with a full opinion the following April. It
again recognized that the degree of deference accorded to the village’s choice
of CV was “quite strong,” agreeing with the court in Euclid CSB that “[a]
district court may not substitute its own remedial plan for defendant’s legally
acceptable one, even if it believes another plan would be better.”140 It further
noted that “[t]here is no case law that rejects cumulative voting as a lawful
remedy under the Voting Rights Act” and stated, to the contrary, that “[f]ederal
courts have repeatedly mentioned cumulative voting as a remedial option in
Voting Rights Act cases.”141

135. Id. at 758 n.19.
136. See Summary Order at 3–4, United States v. Vill. of Port Chester, 704 F. Supp. 2d 411
(S.D.N.Y. 2009) (No. 06-15173), ECF No. 115.
137. Id. at 4.
138. Id. at 3, 5. The Consent Decree was approved on December 22, 2009. An Addendum to
Consent Decree, concerning the design of the ballot and early voting sites, was approved on
February 23, 2010. Vill. of Port Chester, 704 F. Supp. 2d at 452.
139. Summary Order, supra note 136, at 5–6. The details were to include, at a minimum, “the
form, format, and schedule for providing voter education; bilingual poll workers; Spanishlanguage materials; practice voting; and the duration of such outreach efforts.” Id. at 5.
140. Vill. of Port Chester, 704 F. Supp. 2d at 448. The court dismissed the DOJ’s argument
that SMDs are “preferable remedies” in section 2 cases as “not relevant.” Id. at 453.
141. Id. at 448.
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It also stated, as did the court in Euclid CSB, that the remedy must provide
minority voters with “a genuine opportunity” to elect representatives of their
choice, not a guarantee.142 It again concluded that because the Hispanic CVAP
percentage in the village, whether based on the 2000 census (21.9) or the 2006
estimate (27.5), was “well above” the value of the threshold of exclusion (14.3
in a six-seat CV election), the CV arrangement would provide Hispanics with a
genuine opportunity to elect a representative to the board.143 And further, the
court found that based on the 2006 CVAP estimate, “the Hispanics are also
close to being able to guarantee the election of two representatives of their
choice using plumping” (see Table 3).144
The court’s conclusion was bolstered by evidence from the liability phase
of the case that Hispanics had voted in a very cohesive fashion for Hispanic
candidates in previous elections, and therefore it was “highly likely” that they
would plump their votes behind a candidate in a CV election.145 It was also
bolstered by its expectation that Hispanic turnout would increase in a CV
election because their opportunity to elect a representative of their choice was
enhanced by that arrangement.146 The court also repeated its insistence on an
educational program as a condition of meeting the genuine opportunity
standard.147
V. FIRST ELECTIONS
The first use of the CV system in Port Chester was in the June 15, 2010
special election for all six seats on the Board of Trustees. It resulted in a
Hispanic candidate finishing fourth in the vote and winning a seat. The initial
LV election for the Euclid City School Board was held on November 3, 2009.
The African American candidate in that contest was not elected, although the
candidate with by far the largest support among African American voters did
win.

142. Id. at 451; United States v. Euclid City Sch. Bd., 632 F. Supp. 2d 740, 744 (N.D. Ohio
2009).
143. Vill. of Port Chester, 704 F. Supp. 2d at 450–51.
144. Id. at 451.
145. Id. at 450.
146. Id. at 451. The court also noted that the at-large CV system complied with the one
person, one vote rule, and did not entail an “improper use of race,” issues that are present in
district-based remedies. Id. at 452–53.
147. Id. at 451. For details of the implementation of the extensive voter education program,
see VILLAGE OF PORT CHESTER, FINAL REPORT – CONSENT DECREE COMPLIANCE: JUNE 15,
2010 BD. OF TRUSTEE ELECTIONS (July 15, 2010) (on file with PUBLIC LAW REVIEW).
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Port Chester

There were 13 candidates on the ballot for the CV election in Port Chester,
two of whom were Latino.148 A third Latino also filed to be a candidate but
submitted his papers too late to make the ballot.149 He subsequently ran a
write-in campaign.150 This election was a partisan election, with several
parties listing candidates on the ballot.151 Lever voting machines were used,
with parties identified along the columns of the ballot and levers for each
candidate along the rows.152 The Republicans were the only party to nominate
a full-slate of candidates, and all six were also listed under Citizen’s for Tax
Relief, so there were 114 levers available to be pulled.153
The number of votes cast in the CV election was 3,357, which is reportedly
“at least 10% higher than in recent Port Chester municipal elections.”154 Over
95% of the respondents to the poll stated that they had cast all six of their votes
in the election.155 The percentage of the votes received by each candidate is
reported in Table 4, along with their party identifications and the absolute
numbers of votes they received. Luis Marino, one of four Democratic
nominees, was the successful Latino candidate, placing fourth with 10.1% of
the vote and winning a seat. This was the first time a Latino had ever obtained
a position on the board.156 Fabiola Montoya, a Latina nominated by the
Republican Party, finished tenth with 5.1%, and the Latino write-in candidate
finished thirteenth overall with 3.7%.157
There were three incumbents in the contest, two Democrats seeking
reelection and one Republican who had been appointed to fill a vacancy on the
board.158 One Democratic incumbent, Daniel Brakewood, placed second with

148. See infra Appendix.
149. Nathan Mayberg, Candidate thrown off ballot starts write-in campaign, PORT CHESTER
WESTMORE NEWS (June 11, 2010), http://pc.westmorenews.com/index.php?current_edition=
2010-06-11.
150. Id.
151. See infra Appendix.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. DAVID C. KIMBALL & MARTHA KROPF, CUMULATIVE VOTING EDUCATIONAL
PROGRAM EXIT POLL REPORT PORT CHESTER, NY, FINAL REPORT 1 (July 20, 2010), available at
http://www.scribd.com/doc/34680247/PC-Survey-Report-July20.
155. Id. at 30.
156. Leah Rae, Port Chester’s six trustees sworn in after landmark election, SOUND SHORE
(July 6, 2010), http://soundshore.lohudblogs.com/2010/07/06/port-chesters-six-trustees-sworn-inafter-landmark-election/#more-7564.
157. Leah Rae, Port Chester elects first Latino trustee: Winners are Marino, Didden,
Brakewood, Branca, Kenner, Terenizi, SOUND SHORE (June 16, 2010), http://soundshore.lohud
blogs.com/2010/06/16/port-chester-elects-first-latino-trustee-winners-are-marino-didden-brake
wood-branca-kenner-terenzi/#more-6918.
158. Id.
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13.0% of the votes and won a seat, the other, Gregory Adams, finished seventh
with 6.6%.159 The Republican incumbent, Joseph Kenner, also won a seat,
finishing fifth with 7.2% of the vote.160 This was the first time an African
American had ever been elected to the board.161 Joining Brakewood, Marino,
and Kenner on the board were Bart Didden, an independent candidate listed
under the ballot label Taxpayers Relief Movement, with 13.2% of the vote,
John Branca, the only nominee of the Conservative Party, with 10.8%, and
Saverio Terenzi, a Republican with 6.8%.162 The party breakdown on the
board therefore would be two Democrats, two Republicans, a Conservative,
and an independent.

Table 4: Vote for Candidates in the Port Chester City Council Cumulative
Voting Election, June 15, 2010163
Candidate

Party Affiliation

Total Votes

% of Votes

Bart Didden

independent

2,584

13.2

Daniel Brakewood

Democratic

2,529

13.0

John Branca

Conservative

2,101

10.8

Luis Marino

Democratic

1,966

10.1

Joseph Kenner

Republican

1,406

7.2

Saverio Terenzi

Republican

1,327

6.8

Gregory Adams

Democratic

1,283

6.6

Gene Ceccarelli

independent

1,238

6.3

Richard Cuddy

Republican

1,033

5.3

Fabiola Montoya

Republican

1,002

5.1

Philip Semprevivo

Republican

903

4.6

159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Jenny Shen and Nic Riley, On Port Chester’s Election, BRENNAN CENTER FOR JUST.
(June 22, 2010), http://www.brennancenter.org/blog/archives/on_port_chesters_election_and_
counting_minority_votes/.
162. Rae, supra note 157.
163. Calculated by author from the Official Return of Votes for General Officers, Village of
Port Chester, NY, June 15, 2010, provided by the Village Clerk.
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Michael Scarola

Republican

761

3.9

John Palma

independent
(write-in)

718

3.7

Anothny Saline

Democratic

656

3.4

* = Incumbent.
The Consent Decree on the implementation of the CV system specified
that an exit poll be conducted for purposes of evaluating the extent to which
voters understood their options to cumulate votes behind a candidate or
candidates, how frequently they used those options, and how they reacted to
the new voting system.164 The poll did not ask voters the number of votes they
gave to the various candidates.165 Voter responses to some of the items on the
poll are reported in Table 5, in which the responses of all voters participating
in the poll, and those for Latino voters participating in the poll, are provided.
Table 5: Reponses to the Port Chester Exit Poll166

Item
A. “Before voting, today, how
familiar were you with cumulative
voting?”

% of All
Respondents

% of Latino
Respondents

Very familiar

23.3

41.1

Somewhat familiar

28.6

32.9

Not very familiar

22.8

15.8

Not at all familiar

25.4

10.3

72.2

77.3

B. “How easy was it to understand
the voting instructions in this
election?”
Very easy

164. Consent Decree at 23–24, United States v. Vill. of Port Chester, 704 F. Supp. 2d 411
(S.D.N.Y. 2010) (No. 06-15173).
165. See generally KIMBALL & KROPF, supra note 154.
166. These results are reported in or calculated from id. at 1.
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21.8

18.2

Somewhat difficult

4.4

4.0

Very difficult

1.7

0.5

I gave all my votes to 1 candidate

34.2

50.9

I gave my votes to 2 candidates

18.4

14.9

I gave my votes to 3 candidates

15.8

11.1

I gave my votes to 4 candidates

8.3

4.2

I gave my votes to 5 candidates

4.2

2.1

I gave my votes to 6 candidates

19.1

16.7

Easier

23.5

48.7

About the same

66.5

46.8

9.8

4.5

C. “Which answer below best
describes how you voted in the
Board of Trustees election?”

D. “Compared to previous
elections, was casting your ballot in
this election easier, about the same,
or more difficult?”

More difficult

Reported in the first column of the table are the percentages of participants
in the exit poll that responded to an option for the respective items in the table.
Item A is a question concerning how familiar they were with the CV system
before they voted. Just over half of the respondents, 51.9%, reported that they
were either “very familiar” (23.3%) or “somewhat familiar” (28.6%) with the
system before they voted. Item B is a question concerning how understandable
the voting instructions for casting votes in the cumulative election were to
voters. Almost all of the respondents, 94.0%, found them to be “very easy”
(72.2%) or “somewhat easy” (21.8%) to understand.
Item C is a question concerning whether voters exercised their option to
cumulate votes behind a particular candidate or candidates. Over 80% of the
respondents reported cumulating votes to some extent, with 34.2% saying they
“plumped” all six of their votes behind one candidate, and another 34.2%
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saying they cast their votes for just two of three candidates. Less than 20%
(19.1%) reported voting in the traditional way in an at-large election, giving
six different candidates one vote apiece. Clearly, the cumulative voting system
is not nearly as complex for voters to understand and use as critics of
cumulative voting assert. This is now a consistent finding in studies of CV
elections.167
Respondents to the poll were asked to evaluate their experience with the
CV election on a scale from excellent to poor. The result was, “[a]cross all
demographic groups, roughly nine in ten voters rated the voting experience as
excellent or good.”168 The final item in Table 5, item D, is a question asking
voters to compare the degree of difficulty in voting in this CV election with
voting in previous elections. Almost two-thirds said that it was “about the
same,” while 23.5% said it was “easier” compared to only 9.8% who said it
was more difficult. The fact that more find it easier than more difficult might
be counterintuitive, given that cumulative voting increases the number of
permutations in which votes may be cast. But it could also make it easier for
voters who prefer one or a few candidates more strongly than any of the others,
relieving them of strategic considerations they might face under traditional
voting rules in multi-seat elections. In that context, in addition to voting for
their more preferred candidate or candidates, voters have to decide whether to
cast their remaining votes for less preferred candidates who are competing with
their more preferred choice or choices. Those votes could assist in the defeat
of those more preferred. Voters with strong relative preferences could find that
the option to cumulate votes simplifies their decision.
Latinos constituted 22.1% of the respondents to the exit poll.169 The
pollsters concluded that they were only “slightly overrepresented” in the poll
due to their participation rate in it being somewhat higher than that for the
other voters.170 Latino voters therefore appear to have exceeded the threshold
of exclusion for the six-vote CV system, 14.3%, by a comfortable margin.
Latino voters’ responses to the poll questions are reported in the second
column in Table 5. They reported being more familiar with the voting system
before voting than did the other voters, with 74.0% reporting being either
“very familiar” (41.1%) or “somewhat familiar” (32.9%) with it. Given that
the cumulative system was adopted to enhance their opportunity to elect a
representative of their choice, Latinos might have been more receptive to the

167. Abigail Thernstrom, for example, in writing about the CV remedy in Port Chester,
asserts that CV is “generally considered hard for voters to understand and use effectively.”
Thernstrom, supra note 55, at 36. This is inconsistent with not only the evidence from the Port
Chester poll itself, but also the empirical studies cited in notes 45 and 48, supra.
168. KIMBALL & KROPF, supra note 154, at 43.
169. Id. at 52.
170. Id. at 51.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

130

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY PUBLIC LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XXX:97

village’s educational outreach program. They also reported, at a 95.5% rate,
finding the CV instructions to be “very easy” (77.3%) or “somewhat easy”
(18.2%).
Latino respondents were also far more likely to use their cumulative
options than other voters. Just over half of the Latino respondents to the poll
reported plumping all six of their votes for one candidate, while another 26.0%
stated that they divided their votes between just two or three candidates. Only
16.7% of the Latinos reported casting one vote for each of six different
candidates. As noted above, respondents to the poll were not asked which
candidate or candidates they voted for, but it is certainly reasonable to believe
that the extensive plumping by Latinos was a major factor in the first election
of a Latino to the village Board of Trustees.171 Numerous studies of CV have
documented that plumping by minority voters has been a major factor in the
election of minority candidates in those elections.172
Latino voters were also more likely to report that they found CV to be an
“easier” way to cast their ballot than other voters. Almost half of them, 48.7%,
stated as such, while another 46.8% found it “about the same” in difficulty.
Only 4.5% reported it to be “more difficult.” This could be expected given the
high percentage of Latino voters plumping for one candidate, or otherwise
cumulating some of their votes for one or more candidates, and thereby
avoiding casting many or any votes for competing candidates.173
B.

Euclid City School Board

The first election under LV in Euclid, a nonpartisan election, drew four
candidates for the three seats, the three white incumbents and an African
American.174 All three incumbents were reelected. Reported in Table 6 are the

171. See supra note 157. The court had found, in its decision finding that Port Chester’s
previous at-large system resulted in minority vote dilution in violation of Section 2 of the VRA,
that “voting in the Village is polarized along racial lines.” See United States v. Vill. of Port
Chester, 704 F. Supp. 2d 411, 444 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). Hispanics were found to vote “cohesively,”
while “the non-Hispanic community tends to vote as a bloc, generally resulting in the defeat of
the Hispanic preferred candidates.” Id.
172. See studies cited supra note 44.
173. The Port Chester Board of Trustees voted 4 to 2 on February 22, 2011, to appeal the
district court’s decision holding that Port Chester’s previous at-large system violated the VRA.
Mr. Marino, the newly elected Latino member to the Board, voted against the appeal. Leah Rae,
Port Chester board votes to appeal voting rights case, SOUND SHORE (Feb. 23, 2011),
http://soundshore.lohudblogs.com/2011/02/23/port-chester-board-votes-to-appeal-voting-rightscase/.
174. Votes were cast in the School Board election by 30.6% of the registered voters in Euclid.
CUYAHOGA COUNTY GENERAL ELECTION NOVEMBER 3, 2009, AMENDED RESULTS,
http://boe.cuyahogacounty.us/pdf_boe/en-US/Nov03AmendedresultsCanvass.htm.
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total votes received by each candidate and an estimate of the racial breakdown
in candidate support by the DOJ’s expert in Euclid CSB, Lisa Handley.175
Kent Smith was the candidate most preferred by both the African
American and white voters. His margin of preference however was much
larger among African Americans. He is estimated to have received a majority
of the votes cast by African Americans, 51.9%. The candidate with the second
most support from African American voters was the African American, Evette
Moton, whose support within the group is estimated to have been just 18.9%.
Ms. Moton not only trailed Mr. Smith by 33.0% among African American
voters, she also did not win a majority of the remaining African American
votes that were not cast for Smith. Her second place finish in the African
American vote is based on her exceeding the group’s support for Angela Lisy
and Donna Sudar, the other incumbents, by just 2.1% and 5.0% respectively.
The white vote was divided almost entirely among the three incumbents; Mr.
Smith received an estimated 36.9%, Ms. Lisy 33.2%, and Ms. Sudar 24.4%.
The estimate for Ms. Moton is only 5.2%.

Table 6: Vote for Candidates in the Euclid City School Board Cumulative
Voting Election, November, 2009176

Candidate

Total Vote
Number
%

Estimated %
African
American Vote

Estimated %
White Vote

Smith, Kent

4,429

40.6

51.9

36.9

Lisy, Angela

3,171

29.1

16.8

33.2

Sudar, Donna

2,358

21.6

13.9

24.4

Moton, Evette

939

8.6

18.9

5.2

175. Lisa R. Handley, Analysis of 2009 School Board Election for U.S. v. Euclid City School
District Board of Education at 8, United States v. Euclid City Sch. Bd., 632 F. Supp. 2d 740 (N.D.
Ohio 2009) (No. 08-2832), ECF No. 51-2 [hereinafter Handley Report]. Dr. Handley provides
estimates based on three procedures. Those reported in this article are based on the ecological
inference procedure (EI) developed by Gary King and identified in GARY KING, A SOLUTION TO
THE ECOLOGICAL INFERENCE PROBLEM: RECONSTRUCTING INDIVIDUAL BEHAVIOR FROM
AGGREGATE DATA 17–22 (1997). EI is widely preferred over the other two used, ecological
regression and homogeneous precinct analysis.
176. Total Vote, see CUYAHOGA COUNTY GENERAL ELECTION, NOVEMBER 3, 2009
AMENDED OFFICIAL SUMMARY REPORT, http://www.boe.cuyahogacounty.us/pdf_boe/enUS/Nov03OfficialSummaryAmended.htm. Estimated Votes, see Handley Report, supra note
175, at 8.
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The following April the DOJ moved to vacate the remedy based on this
single election.177 Its argument focused on the turnout differences between
African Americans and whites.178 The court in Euclid CSB stated that the LV
system provided African Americans a meaningful opportunity “even though
they will need to increase their turnout percentage to take full advantage of
it.”179 African American turnout in this election was estimated by Handley to
be 11.4% of their VAP, while white turnout was 31.2%.180 In a report in
support of the DOJ’s motion, she stated that African Americans had turned out
in this election at “a rate comparable to their past participation in local
elections.”181 Her estimate of the African American percentage of all the
voters in this election was 19.8%, leaving them 5.2% below the threshold of
exclusion.182
DOJ argued that the election demonstrated that the LV remedy was not
legally valid because it did not cleanse the dilution found in the previous atlarge arrangement, and should be replaced by a SMD arrangement or LV
without the staggered terms, which would lower the LV threshold of exclusion
to 16.7%.183 As noted above, the challenge was based primarily on the African
American turnout in this election, which it stated “remained ineffectually
low.”184 This was attributed to the persistent vestiges of racial discrimination
in Euclid.185
It further maintained that given the racial disparity in turnout in the
election, “African-American voters will not be able, in the foreseeable future,
to elect a candidate of their choice unless that candidate also happens to be
white.”186 This is hardly demonstrated by one election, especially this one,
given that it was not an election in which non-African American voters vetoed
an African American candidate who was the choice of a cohesive set of
African American voters.

177. United States’ Motion for Relief Pursuant to Rule 60(b)(6), Euclid City Sch. Bd., 632 F.
Supp. 2d 740 (No. 08-2832), ECF No. 51 (hereinafter U.S. Motion for Relief). The DOJ had
filed a notice to appeal Euclid to the Sixth Circuit on September 10, 2009, but voluntarily
dismissed it on November 13, after the 2009 election. More Lawsuit News, BALLOT ACCESS
NEWS (Oct. 1, 2009), http://www.ballot-access.org/2009/100109.html; U.S. Justice Department
Drops Appeal in Euclid, Ohio Case; Victory for Limited Voting, BALLOT ACCESS NEWS (Nov.
13, 2009), http://www.ballot-access.org/2009/11/13/u-s-justice-department-drops-appeal-in-eu
clid-ohio-case-victory-for-limited-voting/.
178. U.S. Motion for Relief, supra note 177, at 5–7.
179. Euclid City Sch. Bd., 632 F. Supp. 2d at 770 (emphasis added).
180. Handley Report, supra note 175, at 4.
181. Id. at 3–4.
182. See id. at 5.
183. U.S. Motion for Relief, supra note 177, at 11–13.
184. Id. at 1.
185. Id. at 10.
186. Id. at 9.
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DOJ argued, however, that voting was racially polarized under the
“separate electorates test of Thornburg v. Gingles.”187 It considered this “test”
satisfied because “[w]hite voters would have elected the three white
candidates; African-American voters would have elected two of the white
candidates and the African-American candidate.”188 In short, the LV system
was dilutive, the DOJ argued, because an African American candidate
receiving 18.9% of the African American vote was not elected.
In Gingles, however, the Supreme Court did not endorse a “mechanical
reliance on this standard,” such as that employed by the DOJ, as a basis for
determining whether the degree of racially polarized voting is “legally
significant” and the system therefore dilutive.189 Whether the defeat of an
African American candidate who received 18.9% of the votes cast by African
Americans, and finished a distant second from the group’s most preferred
candidate, a white candidate who received a majority of their votes, would
satisfy this standard, is very questionable. When over 80% of the African
American voters cast their vote for one of the white opponents of the only
African American candidate, African Americans can hardly be considered
cohesive in their support of her.
The Euclid school board responded by stressing that the candidate that was
the “strong preference” of African American voters in this contest, Mr. Smith,
was elected, and that African American voters “simply did not vote for Ms.
Moton in great numbers.”190 Ms. Moton’s low level of support from African
Americans was further evident in the fact that she finished last among the four
candidates, with only 12.1% of the total vote, in the geographical area of the
illustrative majority-African American school board district that the DOJ
presented at trial.191 She also finished last in the geographical areas of the two
majority-African American districts used in city council elections in Euclid,
with 14.7% of the vote in one and 13.8% in the other.192
187. Id. at 5; Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986) (identifying the basic evidentiary
issues in a minority vote dilution case under Section 2).
188. U.S. Motion for Relief, supra note 177, at 5.
189. See Thornburg, 478 U.S. at 58.
190. Defendant Euclid City School District Board of Education’s Response to Plaintiff’s
Motion for Relief Pursuant to Rule 60(b)(6) at 9–10, United States v. Euclid City Sch. Bd., 632 F.
Supp. 2d 740 (N.D. Ohio 2009) (No. 08-2832), ECF No. 54 [hereinafter Euclid City Sch. Bd.
Response to Mot. for Relief].
191. Id. at 11.
192. See Richard L. Engstrom, Report in Response to Dr. Lisa Handley’s Analysis of 2009
School Board Election for U.S. v. Euclid City District Board of Education at 5, Euclid City Sch.
Bd., 632 F. Supp. 2d 740 (No. 08-2832), ECF No. 54-1 [hereinafter Engstrom Response]. The
African American percentage of the VAP in the DOJ’s illustrative School Board district was 61%
based on the 2000 census. Id. at 4. Dr. Handley provided a “guesstimate” at trial, however, that
it had increased to 74.7% by then. Id. at 5. The two city council districts were 67.3% and 62.3%
African American respectively in VAP as of the 2000 census. Id.
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The defendant argued that this one election was not a basis for vacating the
remedy.193 It noted that not only did Ms. Moton not receive much of the
African American vote, she did not run a campaign comparable to those of the
other candidates.194 She was a “self-starting candidate” who had “little name
recognition.”195 She had no previous political experience. She had never
worked in a campaign, even as a volunteer, and soon recognized that she faced
a “steep learning curve” about campaigning.196 She spent less money on the
campaign than her competitors and engaged in fewer and less extensive
campaign activities than the other candidates.197 Yet she found the campaign
to be “fair and friendly.”198 She further opines that the new LV system gives
her a “fighting chance,” and plans to run again, relying on what she has learned
from her first campaign.199
A decision on the DOJ’s motion to vacate the remedy had not been made
at the time this article was completed.
VI. CONCLUSION
The acceptance of CV and LV by the judges in Port Chester and Euclid
CSB, after adversarial remedial proceedings,200 will result in these election
systems gaining increased attention, especially as we enter the post-2010 round
of redistricting. Small political jurisdictions that do not want to break their
elections down into even smaller districts can be expected to be the most
attentive. The attorney for Lake Park, Florida, for example, concluded that,
given the turnout expected in municipal elections, there would be only about
75 voters casting ballots per district if four SMDs were used in town

193. Id. at 14.
194. The mayor of Euclid was reported to have said that Ms. Moton campaigned less than the
other candidates. He observed campaign material around the city for the three incumbents, but
not for her. Patrick O’Donnell, Euclid Voting Change Doesn’t Net Intended School Board
Results, PLAIN DEALER, Nov. 5, 2009, at A8.
195. Euclid City Sch. Bd. Response to Mot. for Relief, supra note 190, at 12.
196. Id.; Engstrom Response, supra note 192, at 7–11.
197. Euclid City Sch. Bd. Response to Mot. for Relief, supra note 190, at 12–13. Ohio
Campaign Finance Reports filed by the candidates in this election are attached as an Appendix to
the Euclid City School Board’s Response. The following are the campaign expenditures
reported: by Mr. Smith, $4,037.06; by Ms. Sudar, $2,493.95; by Ms. Lisy, $1,517.43; and by Ms.
Moton, $764.23.
198. Id.
199. Id. at 13.
200. Abigail Thernstrom has somehow read into these recent cases that the DOJ is a
proponent of CV and LV, given “its seeming enthusiasm for their much wider adoption.”
Thernstrom, supra note 55, at 34. As an expert witness subjected to cross-examination by DOJ
lawyers during the remedial hearings in both Port Chester and Euclid City Sch. Bd., I can state
that their enthusiasm was in a much different direction.
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commission elections.201 Other jurisdictions may want to avoid large
disparities in VAP and CVAP across districts, and litigation over the same, or
allegations of gerrymandering along partisan and/or racial lines, and litigation
over those issues.
Jurisdictions may also be attracted to a remedy that matches a jurisdictionwide dilution problem. These systems can allow all of the members of a
protected group to participate in the election of representatives of the group’s
choice, rather than only those residing in a particular geographical area or
areas. Likewise, people from across a jurisdiction can be part of the candidate
pool, rather than restricting the pool to only those residing in the restricted area
or areas. Voters are able to join together and form “voluntary constituencies”
with other like minded voters, unconstrained by geography.
Opponents of CV and LV often claim that these are proportional
representation systems.202 This is simply not true. When it comes to minority
representation, Duane Cooper correctly points out that “cumulative voting
admits possibilities but does not impose quotas on how a population should be
represented in an elected body.”203 This is true of LV as well. Minority voters
have taken advantage of these opportunities to elect representatives from
within their own group, a phenomenon documented by numerous studies.204
CV and LV are systems that if structured properly provide opportunities
for minority voters to elect representatives of their choice. The experience in
the Euclid CSB, for the reasons expressed above, and certainly that in Lake
Park, Florida, where no African American ran in the LV election, in no way
negate the opportunity that LV offered the minority groups in those settings.
These opportunities, it appears, were simply not seized.
The discovery by jurisdictions of these advantageous features of CV and
LV, and the acceptance of them by federal judges as remedies for minority
vote dilution when offered by defendant jurisdictions, are new developments.
These are developments that can be expected to result in an increase in the use
201. Telephone Interview with Baird, supra note 23.
202. See, e.g., Thernstrom, supra note 55, at 34.
203. Cooper, supra note 55, at 277–80.
204. See studies cited supra note 44. The LV election in Calera, Alabama did result in the
election of an African American. Scottie Vickery, New City Council Elected in Calera,
BIRMINGHAM NEWS, Nov. 11, 2009, at 4B. This candidate had been elected in the city’s only
African American majority district, but then lost his seat (by only two votes) in an election under
an unprecleared districting plan in which his district no longer had that majority. Id.; see also,
Scottie Vickery, Justice Voids Calera’s Redistricting Plan, BIRMINGHAM NEWS, Mar. 25, 2009,
at 1A, 3A. In the LV election in 2009 that replaced the illegal election, the candidate finished
first among all the candidates and retained a seat on the Bd. Vickery, supra note 204, at 4B; see
also, Scottie Vickery, Calera Finally has Six New Council Members, BIRMINGHAM NEWS (Nov.
10, 2009, 7:48 PM), http://www.allvoices.com/s/event-4594436/aHR0cDovL2Jsb2cuYWwuY29t
L3Nwb3RuZXdzLzIwMDkvMTEvY2FsZXJhX2ZpbmFsbHlfaGFzX3NpeF9uZXdfY291Lmh0b
Ww=. In Lake Park, Florida, no African American was a candidate in the LV election in 2010.
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of these systems around the country, especially among small local
jurisdictions. They can be adopted without adversely affecting minority
electoral opportunities, and in some contexts even increasing them. The
release of the 2010 census figures will stimulate increased attention to how
electoral competition is structured in many jurisdictions, and more adoptions of
CV and LV systems are likely.

ANNUAL VILLAGE ELECTION - VILLAGE OF PORT CHESTER - TUESDAY, JUNE 15, 2010
POLLS OPEN 7:00 A.M. TO 9:00 P.M.
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ELECCIÓN ANUAL DEL PUEBLO - PUEBLO DE PORT CHESTER - MARTES, 15 DE JUNIO DEL 2010
CENTROS DE VOTACIÓN ESTARÁN ABIERTOS DESDE LAS: 7:00 A.M. HASTA LAS 9:00 P.M.
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